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I. INTRODUCTION
A significant part of the health insurance debate which gripped the
country during the first two years of President Clinton's administration
focused on the critical shortage of employer-sponsored health insurance
for disabled, br high risk, employees. Indeed, President Clinton's promise
of universal access in connection with the promotion of his health care
*Thanks to Keith N. Hylton, Steve Siegel, Jane Rutherford, and Stephen Marks for
reviewing and commenting helpfully on earlier drafts of this Article. Thanks also to Brendan
Kevenides for research assistance. I am grateful to the DePaul College of Law Research Fund
for generous financial support.
-Associate Professor of Law, DePaul University.
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plan' is apparently designed to ensure that the increasingly popular
employer practice of excluding high risk employees becomes obsolete. In
the meantime, while the merits of the Clinton plan and its competitors are
'The stated purpose of the President's proposed plan is "to ensure individual and family
security through health care coverage for all Americans in a manner that contains the rate of
growth in health care costs and promotes responsible health insurance practices, to promote
choice in health care, and to ensure and protect the health care of all Americans." H.R. 3600,
103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (emphasis added). In order to be "eligible" for coverage under the
plan one must be either (I) "a citizen or national of the United States;" (2) "an alien
permanently residing in the United States under color of law;" or (3) "a long-term
nonimmigrant." Id. § 1001(c). The "comprehensive benefit package" for eligible individuals
shall consist of hospital services, services of health professionals, emergency and ambulatory
medical and surgical services, clinical preventive services, mental health and substance abuse
services, family planning services and services for pregnant women, hospice care, home health
care, extended care services, ambulance services, outpatient laboratory, radiology, and
diagnostic services, outpatient prescription drugs and biologicals, outpatient rehabilitation
services, durable medical equipment and prosthetic and orthotic devices, vision care, dental
care, health education classes, and investigational treatments. Id. § 1101 (a).
The core of the President's plan is the creation of health alliances. Clinton's Health Plan;
A New Framework for Health Care, N.Y. TMES, Sept. 23, 1993, at A22.
Run by the states under Federal scrutiny, these regional purchasing groups would
collect and distribute premiums, certify health plans and offer them to consumers,
insure that average premiums grow no faster than Federally set limits, collect and
publish data on performance of health plans and negotiate with local doctors and
hospitals to set fees for service provided outside H.M.O.'s.
Id. These alliances would offer consumers three types of medical plans: "an H.M.O., a fee-for-
service plan, or a combination of the two." Id. Patients who choose the H.M.O. option would
only be able to choose between doctors affiliated with that H.M.O. and would pay $10 for an
office visit. Id. Under the fee-for-service option "patients can see any doctor they choose, but
must pay deductibles" of between $200 and $400 for office visits and hospitalization. Id. The
regional alliances would be overseen by a National Health Board, consisting of seven members
appointed by the President. Id.
Most of the cost for health care would be borne by employers. Id. "The plan requires them
to pay at least 80 percent of the average cost of premiums in their region, and to support family
coverage for married workers." Id. Employees "[wiould contribute an average of 20 percent
toward their own insurance premiums, plus any required deductibles or co-paymefits." Id.
2Health Equity and Access Reform Today Act, S. 1770, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993);
Managed Competition Act, H.R. 3222, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); H.R. 4561, 103d Cong.,
2nd Sess. (1994); S. 2109, 103d Cong., 2nd Sess. (1994); H.R. 3918, 103d Cong., 2nd Sess.
(1994); H.R. 3955, 103d Cong., 2nd Sess. (1994); S. 1796, 103d Cong., 2nd Sess. (1994); S.
1807, 103d Cong., 2nd Sess. (1994); Health Care Reform Act, S. 2096, 103d Cong., 2nd Sess.
(1994); S. 2153, 103d Cong., 2nd Sess. (1994); Action Now Health Care Reform Act, H.R.
101, 103 Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); American Health Security Act, H.R. 1200, 103d Cong., 1st
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debated, individuals like John McGann-working and insured--continue
to discover that like their health, their insurance can disappear at any time.
John McGann's story is a straightforward one. In 1982 he began
working for H & H Music Company and was covered by the company's
group medical care plan. Pursuant to the plan, in effect from August 1,
1987 to July 31, 1988, all listed coverages were fully insured, up to a
lifetime maximum of $1 million. In December 1987 McGann was
diagnosed with AIDS. In March 1988 he met with company officials and
discussed his illness. Four months later, all employees were notified that
the medical care plan was terminated effective August 1, 1988, and that a
new group medical/hospitalization plan would become effective and
would limit benefits payable for AIDS-related conditions to a lifetime
maximum of $5,000. No limitation was placed on any other catastrophic
illness. Like many employers hoping to cut health insurance costs, H & H
elected to self-insure' under the new plan. In an arrangement typical of
self-insured firms, H & H entered into an Administrative Services
Agreement with a third party which received administrative services fees
for the sole purpose of administering the plan and paying claims.
Not surprisingly, McGann exhausted the $5,000 limit for coverage of
AIDS by January, 1990. He sued H & H,4 contending that the limitation
for AIDS related conditions violated § 510 of the Employee Retirement
Sess. (1993); National Health Security Act, H.R. 1691, 103d Cong., Ist Sess. (1993);
Consumer Choice Security Act, H.R. 3698, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); American Health
Security Act, H.R. 3960, 103d Cong., 2nd Sess. (1994); Consumer Choice Health Security Act,
H.R. 4550, 103d Cong., 2nd Sess. (1994);. American Health Security Act, S. 491, 103d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1993); Consumer Choice Health Security Act, S. 1743, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993);
Health Security Act, S. 1775, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); Health Security Act, S. 1779, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).3Whether a policy is self-insured depends on who bore the risk under the plan. "If for
example, an ERISA plan only contracted out for someone to 'administer' the plan but the
ERISA plan retained all of the risk of loss due to claims made under the plan, such a plan would
be a self-funded plan." Longoria v. Cearley, 796 F. Supp. 997, 1002-03 (W.D. Tex. 1992).
However, "[i]f a plan paid premiums to some other entity that would bear the risk of the loss,
then the plan would not be self-funded and would be insured." Id.
Determining whether a plan is self-insured is significant because it will determine whether
state or federal law, i.e., ERISA, will apply. "[SItates are prohibited by ERISA from applying
[their own insurance laws] to employee health benefit plans which are self-insured .... As a
result, employers have an added incentive to self-insure to avoid the costs of complying with
state insurance regulations .... " Kathlynn L. Butler, Securing Employee Health Benefits
Through ERISA andthe ADA, 42 EMORY L.J. 1197, 1203 (1993)..




Income Security Act (ERISA) which provides:
[i]t shall be unlawful for any person to discharge, fine,
suspend, expel, discipline, or discriminate against a [plan]
participant or beneficiary for exercising any right to which
he is entitled under the provisions of an employee benefit
plan . . . or for the purpose of interfering with the
attainment of any right to which such participant may
become entitled under the plan.'
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment
in the employer's favor on the ground that the changes McGann
complained of were motivated by a desire to "avoid the expense of paying
for AIDS treatment.N Because the reduction in AIDS coverage affected
all employees and because there was no evidence that H &' H ever
promised that the $1 million cap would be permanent, the court of appeals
concluded that McGann could not demonstrate either that he was entitled
to the higher cap or that he was the victim of personal retaliation., The
Fifth Circuit, in support of its conclusion, noted the following ominous
possibility: "If a federal court could prevent an employer from reducing
an employee's coverage limits for AIDS treatment once that employee
contracted AIDS, the boundaries of judicial involvement in the creation,
alteration or termination of ERISA plans would be sorely tested.",
Whether the court would have come to the same conclusion in the case
of a cancer or heart bypass patient is not certain. 9 We do know, though,
that despite McGann's subsequent death and the Supreme Court's refusal
to hear his appeal,'0 other employers, perhaps taking their*cue from the
Fifth Circuit, began to rewrite their health insurance policies in order to
529 U.S.C. § 1140 (1988), quoted in McGann, 946 F.2d at 403.
6McGann, 946 F.2d at 404.
71d. at 404-05.
Rid. at 408.
9Some have argued that it is not mere coincidence that McGann and similar cases involve
AIDS patients. See, e.g., Michele Zavos, AIDS and Insurance: No Guarantees, 20 HUM. RTS.
Q. 18 (1993) ("People with AIDS and HIV have been singled out for adverse action because
their illness is socially unacceptable, and employers have counted on the fact that other
employees would not object to the reduction of benefits for someone with AIDS."); see also
Bruce Lambert, AIDS Insurance Coverage Is Increasingly Hard To Get, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7,
1989, at Al.
'"Greenberg v. H & H Music Co., 113 S.Ct. 482 (1992).
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dramatically limit or exclude from coverage altogether AIDS and its
related medical conditions. Other employees in situations almost identical
to McGann's have enjoyed legal victories," but not because of a more
"See Mason Tenders District Council Welfare Fund v. Donaghey, No. 93 Civ. 1154
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 1993), in which the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
held that an employer violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) when it rewrote its
plan to exclude payment for AIDS and AIDS-related conditions after an employee, insured
under the plan, came down with the virus. The EEOC recently described
three questions that must be resolved in determining whether an insurance plan
violates the ADA. The first is whether there is a disability-based distinction. If such
a distinction exists, the second and third questions place the burden on the employer
to show that its plan falls within the protection afforded employee benefit plans under
the ADA. To do so, an employer must show that it has a bona fide plan and that the
challenged disability-based distinction is not being used as a subterfuge.
Lizzette Palmer, ERISA Preemption and its Effects on Capping the Health Benefits of
Individuals With AIDS: .A Demonstration of Why the United States Health and Insurance
Systems Require Substantial Reform, 30 Hous. L. REV. 1347, 1378 (1993) (citing EEOC Issues
Guidance on ADA and Insurance, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 109, at AA-I (June 9, 1993)).
The EEOC guidelines indicate that a plan provision is disability-based if it
singles out a particular disability, such as AIDS. Under the guidelines, an AIDS cap
that sets benefits at a lower level than other physical conditions is a disability-based
distinction. Accordingly, if an employer is providing insurance with a disparate cap
for AIDS, it will need to prove that it meets the ADA's standards of non-
discrimination. First, a self-insurer must show that it maintains a bona fide plan
simply by proving that it exists and pays benefits and that it has accurately
communicated the terms of the plan to the covered employees. Second, a self-insurer
must proie that the challenged distinction is not a subterfuge-that is, a disability-
based disparate treatment that is not justified by the risks or costs associated with the
disability.
Id. at 1378-79.
"The subterfuge question will most likely be the focus of capping litigation under the ADA
because it provides the employer with the opportunity to show a business or insurance
justification for the distinction." Id. at 1379. An employer may show lack of subterfuge in one
of two ways:
First, an employer may show that there is not a nondisability-based health insurance
plan change that could be made without breaching the commonly accepted or legally
required standards for the fiscal soundness of such an insurance plan. Second, an
employer may prove necessity by showing that there is not a nondisability-based
change that could be made without creating an unacceptable change in the coverage
or premiums of the plan. An unacceptable change is one that makes the health plan
64 BA YLOR LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:59
generous reading of § 510.12 On the contrary, current § 510 jurisprudence
is at an odd juncture: employers may not terminate employees in order to
remove them from the insurance pool;'3 they may, however, redraft the
effectively unavailable to a significant number of other employees, makes the health
insurance plan so unattractive as to result in significant adverse selection, or makes
the health insurance plan so unattractive that the employer cannot compete in
recruiting and maintaining qualified workers due to the superiority of health
insurance plans offered by other employers in the community.
Id.
2There appears to be consensus that § 510 does not afford employees like McGann
protection from employer's financially motivated decisions to cap or eliminate specific
coverages. In Owens v. Storehouse Inc., 984 F.2d 394 (1 1th Cir. 1993), the Eleventh Circuit
said that "ERISA provides no right to perpetual health insurance with immutable terms." Id. at
400. Storehouse had instituted a $25,000 cap for AIDS claims (down from $1 million) after
five employees contracted the virus. Id. at 396. The court concluded that § 510 "does not
prohibit an employer from crafting its medical plan to meet economic imperatives ... [n]either
does it mandate fixed coverage of catastrophic diseases." Id. at 400. See also Seaman v.
Arvida Realty Sales, 985 F.2d 543, 546-47 (11 th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 308 (1993)
(holding that § 510 is violated when employee is discharged for failing to accept employer's
requirement that she become an independent contractor with concurrent loss of health and other
employee benefits).
31n Folz v. Marriott Corp., 594 F. Supp. 1007 (W.D. Mo. 1984), the district court held that
the defendant, Marriott Corporation, had violated the plaintiff's rights under ERISA when
Marriott discharged him shortly after it was informed that he suffered from multiple sclerosis.
Id. at 1010. The court concluded that the evidence showed that the plaintiff was discharged "to
avoid the economic consequences that would result due to his continued participation in" the
self-funded medical plan offered by Marriott. Id. The court drew the "inference of illegal
motive" based on three circumstances present in this case. Id. First was the timing of the
plaintiff's discharge. Id. at 1014. Two months after plaintiff informed his employer of his
condition he was notified that he was being terminated. Id. The firing came despite 18 years on
the job and consistent "job performance reviews of 'competent' or better." Id. The court was
also impressed by the fact that less than one year prior to plaintiff's termination his salary had
been raised "over the maximum salary range set by Marriott" for his position. Id. See also
Zimmerman v. Sloss Equip., Inc., 835 F. Supp. 1283, 1288 (D. Kan. 1993) (firing plaintiff while
on medical leave and while her health insurance application was pending shows the specific
discriminatory intent necessary to establish a prima facie case under ERISA § 510).
Second, the court was persuaded by the fact that "Marriott did not follow its written
procedures regarding probation for managers as the plaintiff was not given the opportunity to
improve his performance and remain with Marriott." Folz, 594 F. Supp. at 1014. Third,
defendant's financial incentive for terminating plaintiff, and thereby also terminating its
responsibility to provide for his medical care, was substantial. Id. Under Marriott's self-funded
plan it was responsible for 60% of the plan's total costs. Id. at 1015. See also Nemeth v. Clark
Equip. Co., 677 F. Supp. 899, 904-05 (W.D. Mich. 1987) (holding that where a company chose
to close down one of its two plants and evidence showed that pension expenses were
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plan so as to exclude specific medical conditions after learning that a
particular employee suffers from one of those conditions.
While the value of the distinction between employment discrimination
and benefits discrimination to a seriously ill employee is debatable," the
recent Americans with Disabilities Act" clearly is blurring this distinction.
As the Fifth Circuit predicted, ADA jurisprudence is generating
considerable judicial involvement in the creation, alteration and
termination of health insurance plans.)6 This Article examines the
insurance practice of risk classification, particularly as it affects the
considerably more at the closed plant than at the other plant a prima facie violation of ERISA
§ 510 has been established). After considering these three circumstances the district court
concluded that "this is the kind of conduct ERISA was enacted to prevent." Folz, 594 F. Supp.
at 1015.
McGann's situation was quite different from that of Mr. Folz. McGann's position with his
employer was not terminated. Instead, about seven months after informing his employer that he
had contracted AIDS, "H & H Music informed [all of] its employees that.., changes would be
made in their medical coverage." McGann, 946 F.2d at 403. Clearly, the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals found a showing of discrimination more difficult in McGann's case than perhaps it
would have if McGann had simply been fired in a manner similar to that of Mr. Folz.
141n Seaman, the Eleventh Circuit recognized that McGann creates an apparently
"anomalous" result for § 510 jurisprudence: "The combined effect of our holding today and
cases such as McGann is an interpretation of ERISA that prohibits employers from discharging
employees to avoid paying benefits but permits employers, to reduce or terminate non-vested
benefits simply by changing the terms of a plan." Seaman, 985 F.2d at 546.
"
3Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12,101-12,213 (West Supp.
1994). The effect of the ADA on employment (as opposed to employee benefit) opportunities
for the disabled is as yet unclear. Approximately 12,000 charges of ADA violations were filed
in 1993. After one year of ADA enforcement, the percentage of disabled individuals actively
employed remained at its pre-ADA level of 29%. Judith Evans, Federal Disabilities Act No
Panacea for Discrimination in the Workplace, NEWSDAY, July 25, 1993, at 66.
M6As the First Circuit's opinion in Carparts Distrib. Ctr. v. Automotive Wholesalers Ass'n,
Inc., 37 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 1994) demonstrates, some federal courts believe that altering the
coverage terms of a self-insured health plan to limit benefits for AIDS and AIDS-related
conditions may violate both Title I (employment) and Title III (public accomodations) of the
ADA, even where the entity making the alteration is not an employer. The court noted, "The
issue before us is not whether defendants were employers of ... [the AIDS infected individual]
within the common sense of the word, but whether they can be considered 'employers' for
purposes of Title I of the ADA and therefore subject to liability for discriminatorily denying
employment benefits to [him]." Id. at 16. The court then identifies three theories which would
support treating the defendants as employers for purposes of Title I. Id. at 16-18. With respect
to Title III, the First Circuit noted that "public accomodations" are not necessarily limited to
"actual physical structures." Id. at 19. Although noting that a claim under Title III "may be a
less promising vehicle" for AIDS infected plaintiffs, the court concluded that "services" may
properly fall within the ambit of public accomodations. Id. at 20.
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behavior of insureds, and evaluates the various forces which have
converged in recent years to create strong incentives for employers like H
& H to self-insure, cap, or exclude certain coverages altogether. In
particular, it focuses on the misguided regulatory schemes of the various
state legislatures as an inadvertent incentive to self-insure, thereby
avoiding state content-based insurance regulations. The article argues that
the values inherent in risk classification are not compatible with a
"discrimination free" environment. McGann best represents this
inevitable clash between the values associated with risk classification-
efficient pricing and fairness to the many over the few (i.e., the creation of
loss prevention incentives)- and competing values which may be
offended by risk management practices which group individuals by race or
sex, or lead to the outright exclusion of those with stigmatizing medical
conditions such as AIDS. Section II describes the state of post-McGann
jurisprudence and continuing efforts by self-insured employers to avoid or
control catastrophic health care costs. Section III explores in detail the
forces that shape the market for health insurance and examines why small
employer groups face higher premium costs and the effects of the trend
toward self-insurance. In Section IV, the Manhart" case is revisited in
order to evaluate the meaning of "discrimination" in the insurance context
and why risk management practices are not compatible with a
"discrimination-free" environment.
II. MASON TENDERS AND THE ADA
In Mason Tenders," the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) was presented with a set of facts almost identical to those in
McGann: Donaghey, a union member and construction worker, was
diagnosed with AIDS and sued his self-insured,19 multi-employer labor
management-sponsored medical plan when it rewrote its plan and
explicitly excluded all payment for AIDS and AIDS-related conditions.
Notwithstanding the union's vigorous argument that prudent management
of the fund required elimination of coverage for AIDS, the EEOC
17Los Angeles, Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
8Mason Tenders Dist. Council Welfare Fund v. Donaghey, 25 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) p. D-
1 (Feb. 9, 1993) (EEOC District Director's Determination in Charge 160-93-0419, Jan. 28,
1993); No. 93 Civ. 1154 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 1993) (plaintiff's motion for summary judgement
denied).
19For a discussion of risk retention plans (i.e., self-insurance), see supra note 3.
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concluded that the union's action violated the Americans with Disabilities
Act and that the fund "had no viable defense to the charge of
discrimination."2° The EEOC's theory appears to be that the burden of
proof rests with the Fund to show that its disability-based classification is
not a subterfuge for evading the ADA. Because the Fund produced no
evidence of an actuarial justification for the AIDS exclusion, the EEOC
believed that the Fund was discriminating against Donaghey because of
his disability and not as a result of actuarial analysis. This result, while
lauded by disability rights activists," is by no means uncontroversial,22 and
a non-partisan reading of the statute suggests it may also be incorrect.
The fundamental aim of the ADA is a workplace free from
discrimination for the disabled.21 The Act 4 went into effect on a staggered
basis: employers with 25 or more employees in July, 1992, and employers
with 15 or more employees in July, 1994. The principal provision of the
employment section, Title I, is § 102(a), which states, "[n]o covered entity
shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because
2025 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) at D-I (Feb. 9, 1993).
2 n response to the district director's determination in this matter, Thomas Kendricks, a
staff attorney with the Gay Men's Health Crisis, said, "This finding should send a very cold
chill down the backs of employers who try to limit coverage of HIV, AIDS and other disabling.
illnesses by self-insuring. This is a clear signal that the ADA does not allow'employers to save
money by cutting coverage for the most vulnerable employees out of their benefits packages."
Cutting Benefits Violates ADA, N.Y. EEOC District Director Finds, Pens. Rep. (BNA) No. 7., at
422 (Feb. 15, 1993). Cary LaCheen, an attorney with New York Lawyers for the Public Interest
Inc., responded, "We now have the EEOC saying, for the first time, that this type of
exclusionary practice runs afoul of the Americans with Disabilities Act. The law says you can't
discriminate on the basis of disability in any terms of employment and that includes the
distribution of health benefits." Id.
22Dissenters with the EEOC's determination in this matter tend to see this issue as a matter
of "access to health benefits" versus "a fund's struggle for survival;" a struggle "management
must win." AIDS: N.Y. Welfare Fund Seeks Court Order to Kill EEOC AIDS Bias Ruling
Under ADA, Pens. Rep. (BNA) No. 10, at 563 (March 8, 1993). "If these plans are to survive
and continue providing the highest level of benefits to the greatest number of.workers and their
dependents, then they must have the authority to manage their assets in a rational manner," said
Roger Levin, attorney for the Mason Tenders District Council Welfare Fund. Id. "The EEOC's
finding 'is nothing but an attempt by that federal agency to buffalo the Welfare Fund into
providing specified medical benefits not mandated by the plain language of the ADA or is
legislative history."' Id.
23The preamble to the ADA states, "it is the purpose of this chapter--(I) to provide a clear
and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals
with disabilities." 42 U.S.C.A. § 12,101(b) (West Supp. 1994).
24Title I--employment; Title II-public services; Title Ill-privately operated public
accommodations; Title IV-telecommunications; and Title V-miscellaneous issues.
BA YLOR LAW REVIEW
of the disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures,
the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee
compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions and privileges of
employment.",, The statute defines "disability" broadly26 and leaves no
question that a person with AIDS is disabled for purposes of the statute. 2"
The difficulty, for insurance purposes, is that the Act is remarkably
accepting of standard insurance practices. It states, "[Section 501(c)] is
... not intended to disrupt the current nature of insurance underwriting, ' '28
and specifically permits the use of disability-based distinctions for
insurance purposes so long as the distinction is based on traditional risk
management practices and can be supported by actuarial data.29
Employers are free to price discriminate (i.e., set price differentials for the
same level of coverage) in order to reflect the increased risk (higher
expected cost) of covering a person with an expensive-to-treat condition;
they may also exclude or cap coverage of specific conditions. This is
obviously a disability-based practice, but it is permissible so long as it
2542 U.S.C.A. § 12,112(a) (West Supp. 1994).
2"[A] physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life
activities of the individual; a record of such an impairment; or being regarded as having such an
impairment." 42 U.S.C.A. § 12,102(2) (West Supp. 1994).
27H. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 52 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303,
334 ("a person infected with the Human Immunodeficiency Virus is covered under ... the
definition of the term 'disability"' in the Americans with Disabilities Act "because of a
substantial limitation to procreation and intimate sexual relationships."); S. REP. No. 116, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1989) (a person with HIV is covered under the definition of the term
"disability"). The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has reiterated that coverage is
offered by the ADA to a person inflicted with IV. "In interpreting the ADA, the EEOC has
described HIV infection as an impairment that is within the scope of the ADA because it is
inherently substantially limiting." Palmer, supra note 11, at 1376 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20)
(1992)); see also Frank C. Morris, Jr., Americans with Disabilities Act: Overview of the
Employment Provisions, C780 A.L.I. 185, 194 (1993).
2829 C.F.R. § 1630.16(0 app. (1993) (Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the Americans
with Disabilities Act).
29For example,
the plan may not refuse to insure, or refuse to continue to insure, or limit the amount,
extent, or kind of coverage available to an individual, or charge a different rate for
the same coverage solely because of a physical or mental impairment, except where
the refusal, limitation, or rate differential is based on sound actuarial principles or is
related to actual or reasonably anticipated experience.
H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 137 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 420.
(emphasis added).
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enjoys sound actuarial support.30 It is this language- and history of the
ADA which causes one to wonder about the EEOC's conclusion in Mason
Tenders. There is little doubt that AIDS is an expensive condition to
treat3' and that the capping or outright exclusion of AIDS from coverage
would tend to protect the financial integrity of self-insured plans.
If Mason Tenders is simply about the failure of the fund to provide
actuarial support for its decision to limit benefits, then it represents no
more than strict adherence to the anti-subterfuge rule of the ADA. If, on
the other hand, the case can only be understood as an attempt to avoid the
explicit approval risk management techniques enjoyed under the statute,3 2
then it will adversely affect the heretofore unfettered right of ERISA
trustees to limit coverages, manage risk, and create incentives for loss
prevention.
3 It is probably obvious, but worth noting anyway, that any risk management practice which
burdens disabled employees is likely to be actuarially sound. If not, it would prove unreliable
as a method for classifying risks and competitive forces would likely require an insurer to
discard it in favor of something with better predictive ability.
31Many experts have estimated the cost of treating a patient with AIDS or HIV. For
example,
[i]t is estimated ... that the lifetime cost of treating a person with HIV from the time
of infection until death is approximately $119,000. The estimated cost of care from
HIV infection until the development of AIDS is $50,000, while the estimated cost
from AIDS development until death is approximately $69,000.
Fred J. Hellinger, The Lifetime Cost of Treating a Person With HIV, JAMA, July 28, 1993, at
474; see also, David J. Solomon et al., Analysis of Michigan Medicaid Costs to Treat HIV
Infection, PUBLIC HEALTH REP., Sept.-Oct., 1989, at 416.
32Recently, in a case almost identical to McGann and Mason Tenders, a union health plan
agreed to rescind its $50,000 cap on AIDS benefits in connection with the settlement of a claim
that the cap violated the ADA. The participant-decedent's estate and a hospital that provided
indigent care sued the health plan, and asserted that the cap amounted to discrimination based
upon a physical disability. The plan provided a lifetime maximum benefit of $500,000 for all
other conditions. The EEOC intervened in the litigation and likewise alleged ADA violations.
Estate of Kadinger v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 110, No. 3-93-159, 1993 WL
597548 (D. Minn. Dec. 21, 1993). But see Gonzales v. Garner Food Servs., Inc., 855 F. Supp.
371, 374 (N.D. Ga. 1994) (granting employer's motion to dismiss on the ground that terminated
plaintiff was no longer an employee of the company when the AIDS cap amendment was
adopted); Carparts Distrib. Ctr., Inc. v. Automotive Wholesaler's Ass'n of New England, 826
F. Supp. 583, 587 (D.N.H. 1993) (holding that Title I of ADA does not apply to sponsor of
health benefit plan which placed a cap on AIDS related benefits because sponsor was not the
employer of plaintiff).
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III. THE MARKET FOR SMALL GROUP INSURANCE
Why do we observe employers behaving like H & H Music Co." when
making decisions about the health insurance it will offer its employees?
Are the EEOC's instincts good when it asserts that the Mason Tenders
Fund is motivated by discriminatory intent toward people with disabilities
(and not by concern for the financial integrity of its self-funded plan)? An
understanding of the way that insurers classify risk, set prices, and thereby
encourage loss prevention is essential to answering these questions. This
section examines the manner in which insurance is priced and the special
problems small groups face.
A. Insurance Markets
Key to understanding the behavior of employers and insurers31 is the
threshold premise that insurance is a product whose price is a function of
supply and demand. Like other products, as the cost of insurance rises,
demand for it generally decreases." In a competitive market, the insurer
who can develop the most efficient risk classification system---one that
classifies and prices risks most accurately-will compete successfully for
premium dollars. This is because the insurer can, through classification,
offer expected low-cost users lower prices.36 This does not mean that
insurers will go to any lengths to obtain additional information regarding
expected losses. Additional information may be expensive and time
consuming to collect and may result in a marginal improvement in the
efficiency of the classification that is not justified by. the expense. What it
"John McGann was one of 152 employees covered by the plan administered by Brooks
Mays Corporation as of August 1, 1987, according to Mark A. Huvard, a lawyer for H & H.
Huvard says the reason H & H decided to cap coverage for AIDS was that during the previous
year, one or two other employees had died of AIDS related illnesses. H & H began to worry
about consistently getting "creamed" by more employees coming down with AIDS. Telephone
interview with Mark A. Huvard, attorney for H & H Music Company (July 12, 1994). See also
Milt Freudenheim, Employers Winning Wide Leeway to Cut Medical Insurance Benefits, N.Y.
TIMES, March 29, 1992, at AI.
3"Most, but by no means all, health insurance is obtained via the workplace. See Richard
Kronick, Health Insurance, 1979-1989: The Frayed Connection Between Employment and
Insurance, 28 INQUIRY 318 (1991); Alan C. Monheit et al., The Employed Uninsured and the
Role of Public Policy, 22 INQUIRY 348 (1985).
3'Kenneth S. Abraham, Efficiency and Fairness In Insurance Risk Classification, 71 VA. L.
REv. 403, 407 (1985).
36
"The more refined (and accurate) an insurer's risk classifications, the more capable it is of
'skimming' good risks away from insurers whose classifications are less refined." Id. at 408.
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does suggest is that insurers in a competitive market stand to gain from the
creation of an accurate classification system.
The experience of Blue Cross helps to illustrate this point. "When
Blue Cross was created in 1933, premiums were assessed on the basis of a
community rating standard. That is, premiums were the same for all
subscribers without regard to the actual experience of the group.""
Subsequently, Blue Cross was forced to switch from community rating to
experience rating in the face of competition from the for-profit insurance
sector which was luring away low-cost subscribers by classifying them
separately and charging a lower premium. The effect of community
rating, or the failure to classify risks, is the creation of a situation in which
high-cost subscribers are subsidized by low-cost subscribers."8 In a market
where subscribers are not forced to purchase coverage and may choose
among several competing sources for insurance, the failure to classify
risks will be fatal.
Employers with relatively small numbers of employees face special
pricing problems when they enter the market and attempt to purchase
insurance. Health insurance, for example, is considerably more costly for
small groups and individuals than for large employers. This is because
small group per-enrollee marketing costs are higher (a large, one-time fee
to cover the cost of marketing the plan to an employer must be divided
among fewer group members); small groups probably have less ability to
bargain for advantageous rates; and the small group risk pool is smaller,
which requires higher premium rates.39 Concerns about possible adverse
selection effects are more pronounced in small groups as well. Professors
Beam and McFadden have described as "fundamental" the principle that a
group proposed for insurance "must have been formed for some other
purpose than to obtain insurance for its members."'' This is to protect the
insurer against the effects of adverse selection-the selection by high-risk,
3Maria O'Brien Hylton, The Economics and Politics of Emergency Health Care for the
Poor: The Patient Dumping Dilemma, 1992 B.Y.U. L. REv. 971, 992-93.38As noted elsewhere, one might defend community rating on equity grounds if the subsidy
toward high-cost subscribers was also a subsidy toward low income subscribers. There is
evidence, though, that this is not the case. Id. at 993.39As Professor Mark Hall has noted, "According to the statistical Law of Large Numbers,
the ability to predict accurately the actual loss a group will suffer decreases as the group
becomes smaller; therefore, small risk pools require a larger risk premium per equivalent
expected loss than do larger groups." Mark A. Hall, The Role of Insurance Purchasing
Cooperatives in Health Care Reform, 3 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 95, 98 (1993-94).
4°BuRTON T. BEAM, JR. & JOHN J. MCFADDEN, EMPLOYEE BENEFITs 70 (3d ed. 1992).
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high-cost insureds of insurance options against which they are likely to
make significant claims.41
Thus, the insurance market firms face is affected by the quality of the
classification system that determines price (premium), the probability of a
covered event occurring and the expected loss, and the risk aversion of the
purchaser. The last factor, risk aversion, assumes that the insurance in
question is not mandated and that the purchaser always retains the option
of accumulating savings in order to cover any future losses.42
B. Perverse State Mandates and ERISA 's "Regulation-Free" Zone
Numerous commentators have noted the recent growth in self-
insurance.41 This growth is propelled by the twin forces of well
41Given the obvious fact that high-risk persons, e.g., those with high blood pressure, have
the greatest need for health and life insurance, the phenomenon of adverse selection is not
difficult to understand. A person with high blood pressure may be more likely to seek health
insurance than someone in tip-top shape. See FRANK J. ANGELL, INSURANCE PRINCIPLES AND
PRACTICES 9 (1959). However, insurers and persons of average or low risk have powerful
incentives to reduce the effects of adverse selection.
If the insurer cannot distinguish high- and low-risk individuals he must offer them the
same premium. Low risk individuals are worse off and high risk individuals better
off compared with the situation in which the insurer knows the risk class of insureds.
The insurer has an incentive to identify low-risk individuals since he could increase
his expected profits by offering a policy to low risks at a premium below the pooled
premium but greater than the low risks' accident probability.
Hugh Gravelle, Insurance Law and Adverse Selection, 11 INT'L REV. L & ECON. 23, 25 (1991).
Furthermore, in an insurance market in which adverse selection is substantially present, low risk
individuals "actually subsidize the insurance purchases of high risks," thereby reducing
insurance consumption by "low-risk" insureds. Mark J. Browne & Helen I. Doerpinghaus,
Information Asymmetries and Adverse Selection in the Market for Individual Medical Expense
Insurance, 60 J. OF RISK & INS. 300, 300 (1993). See also Mark J. Browne, Evidence of
Adverse Selection in the Individual Health Insurance Market, 59 J. OF RISK & INS. 13, 13
(1992).
42See generally PAUL J. FELDSTEIN, HEALTH CARE ECONOMICS 159 (3d ed. 1988).
43
"Self-insurance grew 19.4 percent (from $32 billion to $38.2 billion) while conventional
market premium volume rose just 3.8 percent (from $115.6 billion to $120 billion) between
1988 and 1990." L.H. Otis, Self-Insureds Proliferate in Soft Market, 95 NAT'L UNDERWRITER,
Nov. 25, 1991, at 1, 38. Growth in self-insurance has continued so far through the 1990s.
"Self-insurance accounted for 27% of the ... commercial risk financing market in 1992" and
was projected to occupy 30% of the market by the end of 1993. Sara Marley, Alternative Risk
Financing Continues to Gain Strength, 27 Bus. INS., Jan. 25, 1993, at 3.
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intentioned, but ultimately harmful, state regulation and ERISA's content-
neutral stance on coverage." Self-insurance (also known as a self-funded
or risk-retention plan) 41 is particularly attractive to employers because it
frees them from the oversight of state insurance commissioners and the
relentless political forces that produce insurance mandates.
1. Mandates and More Mandates
As the noted economists George Stigler" and Sam Peltzman 7 have
It is important to note, however, that while growth in market share continues, it has slowed
from its rapid pace of the late-I 980s. Between 1991 and 1992 the number of employers opting
to self-insure only rose by 2%, down from a rise of 6% between 1990 and 1991. Id. Some
health care consultants have explained this slowed rate of growth by pointing out that "the
majority of employers capable of successfully self-insuring are already doing so." Id.
"Beginning in 1977 and culminating in the 1985 U.S. Supreme Court decision in
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985), federal courts have
interpreted ER1SA's preemption provisions to permit states to regulate and tax the insurance
products of commercial insurance companies and Blue Cross/Blue Shield. Id. at 746. The
Supreme Court pointed out that ERISA generally supersedes 'any and all State laws insofar as
they ... relate to any employee benefit plan."' Id. at 732 (construing 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a)).
However, the question before the Court was whether a state statute that required "specified
minimum mental-health-care benefits,",was an attempt by the state to "regulate insurance," as
opposed to an "employee benefit plan," and therefore fell within an exception to ERISA's
preemption provision. Id. at 727. This exception, known as the "saving clause,", states that
"nothing in ERISA 'shall be construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any
State which regulates insurance, banking, or securities."' Id. at 733 (construing 29 U.S.C.
§ I144(b)(2)(B)) (emphasis added). Noting that ERISA's two preemption provisions seem to
contradict one another, the court nonetheless concluded that Congress did not intend to preempt
areas of traditional state regulation such as mandated-benefits. Id. at 744.
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's ruling on insured plans, employer's self-insured
plans have been beyond the reach of state regulators. See Daniel M. Fox and Daniel C.
Schaffer, Health Policy and ERISA: Interest Groups and Semipreemption, 14 J. HEALTH POL.,
POL'Y, & L. 239 (1989). Choosing to ignore this distinction, the Supreme Court, in
Metropolitan Life, pointed out that if this distinction is to be eradicated, change will have to
come from Congress and not the courts. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 471 U.S. at 747.
"'For an excellent discussion of the legislative give and take that culminated in permitting
the states to regulate insurance companies but not self-insured health plans, see Daniel M. Fox
and Daniel C. Schaffer, "Semi-Preemption in ERISA: Legislative Process and Health Policy," 7
AM. J. TAX. POL'Y 47, 48-52 (1988).
46Stigler's central thesis has been that "as a rule, regulation is acquired by," as opposed to
being thrust upon, a particular "industry and is designed and operated primarily for its benefit."
George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. OF ECON. & MGMT. Scl. 3, 3
(1971). Stigler points out that making these regulatory acquisitions is much akin to the
purchasing of any consumer good thanks to a political system in which elected representatives
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explained, the process by which small interest groups come to dominate a
regulatory process is less of a mystery than it may first appear. Basically,
the interests of small groups (in this case various health care providers or
those with special health care needs) tend to overshadow those of large
groups (generally the public at large) because "the costs of using the
political process limit not only the size of the dominant group but also
their gains."4 This is not difficult to explain if politics is viewed in terms
of a supply and demand economic model "with constituents on the
demand side and their political representatives on the supply side."41
Simply put, because getting the most from the political processes is quite
expensive,O only a small number of entities can afford to do so.
Viewed in this way, the market. ., will distribute more of
the good to those whose effective demand is highest. For
Stigler, the question of which group will have the highest
effective demand translates very quickly into a question of
have the power to "coerce" and private industry has the means and ability to provide these
representatives with the campaign contributions necessary to keep them in office. He states,
If the representative denies ten large industries their special subsidies of money-or
governmental power, they will dedicate themselves to the election of. a more
complaisant successor: the stakes are that important.... A representative cannot win
or keep office with the support of the sum of those who are opposed to: oil import
quotas, farm subsidies, airport subsidies, hospital subsidies, unnecessary navy
shipyards, an inequitable public housing program, and rural electrification subsidies.
Id. at 11.




5 The "expense" of political consumerism is explained by Peltzman in two ways. First,
"[Tihe size of the dominant group is limited .,.. by the absence of something like ordinary-
market-dollar voting in politics." Id. at 213. In other words, "[T]he voter must spend resources
to inform himself about [an issue's] implications for his wealth and which politician is likely to
stand on which side of the issue. That information cost will have to offset prospective gains,
and a voter with a small per capita stake will not, therefore, incur it." Id. Second, a "major
limit on effective group size arises from costs of organization. It is not enough for the
successful group to recognize its interests; it must organize to translate this interest into support
for the politician who will implement it." Id. The expense involved in creating an organized
effort to effect regulatory change is obviously far more substantial for the average, or even
above average, consumer than for the small group.
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numbers. In this view, "producer protection" represents
the dominance of a small group with a large per capita
stake over the large group (consumers) with more diffused
interests."
It is not possible to understand the current movement toward the
creation of risk-retention pools2 without first looking at the regulatory
activity of state legislatures with respect to insurers. Clearly, for example,
as insurance coverage mandates have increased, the number of covered
employees has decreased.13 All fifty states, to one extent or another, now
regulate the terms of group health insurance contracts.5 4  Some states
demand maternity coverage." Others require benefits for mental health
problems,56 prosthetic devices,57 and alcohol and drug treatment."
511d. at 212.
"Otis, supra note 43, at 38; Marley, supra'note 43, at 3.
53As two commentators stated,
Mandates typically stipulate that certain benefits be included in a group plan, if one is
offered. By making insurance more expensive, minimum coverage rules may price
some firms out of the insurance market. Especially vulnerable are small firms that
face much higher premiums to begin with. ERISA grants self-insured benefit plans
exemption from all state insurance laws and taxation. Small firms, however, cannot
viably self-insure as a means of circumventing mandated benefit requirements.
Ironically, it is these very firms where coverage needs to be encouraged if we are to
reduce the number of employed uninsured.
Gail A. Jensen & Jon R. Gabel, State Mandated Benefits and the Small Firm's Decision to Offer
Insurance, 4 J. REG. ECON. 379-404 (1992) (emphasis added).54Professor Rothstein has noted that there are more than 1000 state mandates in existence.
Mark A. Rothstein, Genetic Discrimination in Employment and the Americans with Disabilities
Act, 29 HOuS. L. Rev. 23, 80 (1992).
"California: CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 231 (West 1994); Colorado: COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 10-16-104 (West Supp. 1994); Minnesota: MINN. STAT. ANN. § 62A.041 (West
Supp. 1994); New Jersey: N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17B: 26-2.1b (West Supp. 1994); and New York:
N.Y. INS. LAW § 3216 (McKinney 1993).
56District of Columbia: D.C. CODE ANN. § 35-2302 (1993); Hawaii: HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 431M-2 (Supp. 1992); Kentucky: KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.17-3185 (Michie/Bobbs-
Merrill Supp. 1994); Mississippi: MISS. CODE. ANN. § 83-9-39 (1991); Missouri: MO. ANN.
STAT. § 376.381 (Vernon Supp. 1994); Montana: MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-22-703 (1993);
New Hampshire: N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 415:18-a (1992 and Supp. 1993); Tennessee: TENN.
CODE ANN. § 56-7-2601 (1994); Texas: TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 3.51-14 (Vernon Supp.
1995).
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Why are state legislatures so quick to mandate health care benefits?
There are several possible explanations. First, legislators may be attracted
to the mandate device because, unlike other decisions to provide
constituents with a service, mandates are "free" and do not require an
increase in taxes. Thus, a legislature can create the appearance of an
expanded "safety net" without the usual accompanying pain of generating
additional revenue.59 Another explanation, the so-called "public interest
rationale," is proffered by regulators themselves. It says that there are
defects in the market for employer health insurance and that the
government must intervene in order to correct them. As Jensen and Gabel
have noted, legislators claim that:
insurers and purchasers may unknowingly undervalue the
benefits of some type of care, such as chemical
dependency treatment, resulting in a demand for coverage
which is "too low" from a societal perspective....
[W]ithout mandates, adverse selection might occur which
drives up employers' cost of particular coverages. This
happens if individuals with chronic conditions tend to
enroll in plans offering more extensive coverage ... and
healthier individuals opt for low-benefit plans....
[A]dverse selection creates a market shortcoming, which a
mandate may be partially able to correct.6
A third rationale that may explain the eagerness of legislatures to impose
mandates is that they may, in some instances, have the effect of actually
reducing state expenditures for treatment costs by shifting these onto the
private sector. If, for example, individuals without mental health benefits
are treated during periods of crisis at state facilities and at state expense,
then the requirement that employers cover this condition relieves the state
of the burden of providing free care.
Each of these explanations may partially describe the dynamics which
"California: CAL. INS. CODE § 10123.7 (West 1993); Alaska: ALASKA STAT. § 21.42.375
(1993); Maryland: MD. ANN. CODE, art. 48A, § 354Q (1993).
8District of Columbia: D.C. CODE ANN. § 35-2302 (1993); Hawaii: HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 431M-2 (1993); Minnesota: MINN. STAT. ANN. § 62A.149 (West 1994); Missouri: Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 376.779 (Vernon 1991); Montana: MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-22-703 (1993);
Texas: TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 3.51-9 (Vernon Supp. 1994).
59See generally Peltzman, supra note 47.60Jensen & Gabel, supra note 53, at 380.
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underlie the imposition of mandates. In any event, the number of
mandates more than doubled from 1979 to 1989.6 This growth has not
gone unnoticed by small employers, and a recent study suggests that a
significant amount of non-coverage is directly attributable to this
increased state regulation.61 Jensen and Gabel found that for 1985
nineteen percent of noncoverage can be explained by state mandates; for
1988 the figure increased to an astonishing forty-three percent.6
This is the sense in which state mandates are "perverse." In spite of the
professed good intentions of regulators, the mandates are causing
employers to exercise one option available to them-to forego offering
insurance of any kind. (Another option, of course, is to reduce the number
of employees in the face of an expensive mandate.) The mandates, which
increase the cost of purchasing insurance (because they require the insurer
to cover a larger number of insurable events), result in a reduction in the
number of employees to whom any health insurance is available. One is
left wondering whether a typical employee would have made the same
choice on her own behalf: If forced to choose between minimal or
moderate coverage or no coverage at all, would she elect to forego
coverage altogether? Probably not.
This raises the same fundamental problem that faced McGann's
employer. Should one accommodate the interests of the greatest number
of employees at the expense of one person? H & H Music believed that
the cost of covering McGann's illness would make it impossible to
provide coverage for anyone else. From the company's perspective the
very existence of the plan itself, its financial integrity, was at stake.
2. ERISA's "Regulation-Free" Zone
Those employers who do not simply decide to forego offering health
insurance to their workers in the face of increasing state mandates, have
another attractive option: self-insurance. Employers who elect to self-
insure remove themselves from the state regulatory arena and, instead, are
governed only by ERISA.64 ERISA is a particularly attractive option
611d.
6 2See generally Jensen & Gabel, supra note 53.631d. at 396.
"Generally, ERISA preempts state law attempting to regulate any "employee benefit plan."
However, a state may still regulate insurance although it may not deem an employee benefit
plan to be an insurance company for the purpose of imposing such regulation. 29 U.S.C.
§ 1144(a)-(b)(2)(B) (1988). As a result of this stipulation, employers choosing to self-insure
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because ERISA plans are not subject to state insurance mandates."
(Indeed, ERISA has been described as a "regulation-free zone," albeit by
those who believe this is a harmful state of affairs.)"6
Thus, the creation of a risk retention plan enables an employer,
regardless of what the otherwise applicable state mandates require, to
regain the ability to fashion a health plan which meets the particular needs
of her employees6? at an acceptable price. This need not always involve
the desire to avoid covering a known catastrophic condition as in McGann.
Imagine, for example, an employer who has a largely single, male work
force between eighteen and forty years of age. In a state which mandates
maternity benefits, infertility treatment, breast reconstruction, and
orthodontia coverages, most employees would find themselves with far
more extensive (and therefore expensive) coverage than they would have
preferred. Some employees might choose to insure against these
may avoid state mandates. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 733
(1985).
6529 U.S.C. § 1144(a) states, "[T]he provisions of this subchapter... shall supersede any
and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan
.... " See generally Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133 (1990); FMC Corp. v.
Holliday, 498 U.S. 52 (1990); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724
(1985). "ERISA's broad preemption has been successful in protecting employers from
inconsistent and conflicting state regulation, allowing them to operate health care plans that are
uniform across many states .... " Butler, supra note 3, at 1239.
6See Alan I. Widiss and Larry Gostin, What's Wrong With The ERISA "Vacuum"?: The
Case Against Unrestricted Freedom for Employers to Terminate Employee Health Care Plans
and to Decide What Coverage is to be Provided When Risk Retention Plans are Established for
Health Care, 41 DRAKE L. REV. 635, 655 (1992). Others have argued that ERISA's preemption
of state regulation has seriously impeded the ability of the state governments to fashion
universal access/universal coverage solutions for the millions of uninsured. See Mary Anne
Bobinski, Unhealthy Federalism: Barriers to Increasing Health Care Access for the
Uninsured, 24 U.C. DAViS L. REV. 255 (1990).
671 have argued elsewhere that one of the peculiar results of state insurance mandates is that
they do not necessarily confer any desirable benefit on any given group of workers who receive
them:
[W]hen the state insists on certain contractual provisions, the parties lose the ability
to fashion a flexible contract that meets the needs of the particular individual or
group in question. This is of particular concern in the health care arena, where access
to coverage is clearly not optimal. Mandated coverage raises the insurer's cost of
doing business (and therefore the cost of insurance), without any necessary
corresponding increase in the satisfaction or security of the insured.
Hylton, supra note 37, at 1002 (emphasis added).
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contingencies, but many would not. Forcing their employer to provide the
coverage has negative consequences for the employees. First, it increases
the chances the employer will drop all coverages. Second, it forces
employers to pay out a portion of compensation 61 to employees in a form
that may be of no value to them.
Given the rush to mandate benefits that has taken place at the state
level over the past fifteen or so years, the increase in the number of
employers choosing to forego the health insurance benefit is not
surprising. In light of the opportunity ERISA creates to regain substantive
control of the terms of the insurance contract, the increase in self-
insurance is also to be expected. What state legislatures all over the
country appear to have forgotten or chosen to ignore is the simple fact that
insurance is a product remarkably like most others. One cannot demand
that employers offer increasingly expensive versions of the product
without, at some point, triggering offsetting (cost-saving) behavior by
employers. Total employee compensation is simply one of many costs of
doing business. Irrational and burdensome increases in those costs (i.e.,
increases that in many cases do not translate into enhanced employee
welfare), without corresponding increases in productivity are doomed to
result in fewer employees, or fewer employees with insurance coverage.
Good intentions notwithstanding, state -mandates are a superficially
attractive, but ultimately shallow approach to the twin problems of
insurance discrimination and lack of access. As McGann amply
demonstrates, the ERISA opt-out option makes state mandates ineffective
for those who can self-insure. The question is what, if anything, can be
done to help an employee in McGann's catastrophic situation, without
jeopardizing benefits for everyone else in, the group.
68Employee benefits are properly understood as merely a portion of total compensation.
The other components are salary or wages, and other benefits, whether mandated (such as social
security, workers compensation or unemployment 'insurance) or non-mandated (such as
vacations, sick leave, disability insurance and so forth). See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1620.10 & 1620.11
(1993) ("Under the [Equal Pay Act], the term 'wages' generally includes all payments made to
[or on behalf of] an employee as remuneration for employment" and "[f9ringe benefits are
deemed to be remuneration for employment." Under the Act, "'[Flringe benefits' includes, e.g.,
such terms as medical, hospital, accident, life insurance and retirement benefits; profit sharing
and bonus plans; leave; and other such concepts.") .
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IV. RISK MANAGEMENT IN A "DISCRIMINATION-FREE"
ENVIRONMENT
The fundamental dilemma of McGann-one person's need for a huge
amount of insurance coverage versus other group members' continued
need for routine coverage-is one that cannot be resolved without first
identifying those values which should inform a group insurance scheme.69
As some have noted, "attitudes toward insurance always seem to be
pulling in two directions--one that highlights the risk assessment or
efficiency-promoting features of insurance classification, and the other
that stresses insurance's risk-distributional function.!'" This section
compares the values of risk classification (efficiency and the creation of
loss prevention incentives) discussed above with the risk-distributional
functions of insurance, and the values implicit in a so-called
"discrimination free" workplace (the goal of the ADA).
A. The Legal Framework and Identifying Risk Distributional Values
It should come as no surprise that, from an insurance perspective, the
McGann conundrum is not new. The tension between efficiency
enhancing risk classifications and a competing discomfort with race, sex,
or income based classifications did not originate with AIDS and John
McGann. On the contrary, in 1978, the U.S. Supreme Court grappled with
essentially the same question of the appropriate limits on classifications
(this time for pension purposes) by sex. In City of Los Angeles,
Department of Water & Power v. Manhart" the Court invalidated a
pension contribution formula that required female employees to contribute
almost fifteen percent more of their paychecks each month to the plan
691 assume here, perhaps naively, that in spite of some indications to the contrary,
employers like H & H Music are motivated not by bigotry toward those disabled by AIDS, but
by a genuine need to maintain the financial viability of their plans or face the prospect of no
coverage for anyone. A case for bigotry, though, might not be terribly hard to make. In Tingle
v. Pacific Mutual Ins. Co., 996 F.2d 105 (5th Cir. 1993), plaintiff brought suit against her
employer's insurance carrier for treatment of a back injury which cost $71,300. This amount is
more than $69,000-the average cost of treating a person with AIDS. See supra note 31. And,
according to Morton Hunt, A Common Sense Guide to Health Insurance, N.Y. TIMES, May 3,
1987, § 6 at 46, 50, 108, "[a] child stricken by leukemia and provided with months of intensive
chemotheraphy at a major hospital can run up a total bill of hundreds of thousands of
dollars.... [A] two year hospitalization in a specialized facility for treatment of a stroke-
induced coma.., could cost a total of $1 million."
7 Abraham, supra note 35, at 404.
71435 U.S. 702 (1978).
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because as a group women live longer than men and were expected,
therefore, to draw on their defined benefit plan" for considerably more
years than male employees. No one took issue with the actuarial validity
of the city's classification-that is, no one argued that in fact men lived,
on average, as long as women. Rather, the plaintiffs (a class of current
and former female employees) took the position that Title VII's"
"Peter T. Scott explains a defined benefit plan as:
a retirement plan in which the benefit is expressed as a certain amount to be paid at
an employee's retirement. Defined benefit plans generally provide for the monthly
payment of a fixed sum, for the life of the retired employee and surviving spouse.
The amount of benefit is derived from a plan formula, which often takes into account
the employee's years of service with the employer, as well as the employee's average
wage or salary.... The formula multiplies these two variables by a percentage,
commonly from one to two percent, to arrive at a fixed sum.
Defined benefit plans do not establish individual accounts for each participating
employee. Instead, plan assets are pooled in a trust which is funded to meet the
aggregate benefit demands of the plan participants. An important feature of defined
benefit plans is that the participant is protected against investment risk; if plan assets
diminish below appropriate funding levels, it is the plan sponsor's duty to increase
pension contributions.
Peter T. Scott, A National Retirement Income Policy, 44 TAx NOTES 913, 919-20 (1989),
reprinted in JOHN H. LANGBEIN & BRUCE A. WOLK, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 39
(1990).
In contrast,
[d]efined contribution plans do not provide specific dollar benefits at retirement.
Instead, the benefits payable to participating employees are based on the amount of
employer contributions to the plan. In a defined contribution plan, the funds
contributed on behalf of each participant are held in a separate account to be paid at
retirement.
Id. at 40. Often with defined contribution plans employees are permitted or even encouraged to
contribute to the plan. Sometimes, as with 401(k) plans, the "employee is given an option of
receiving taxable compensation or deferring current income taxation on the portion of salary
that is contributed to the defined contribution plan." Id. It is also common for an employer to
match the amount contributed by the employee to the plan. Id.
73Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1988). The section
provides in pertinent part:
(a) Employer practices
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer.., to fail or refuse to
hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
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prohibition against discrimination on the basis of sex forbade this practice.
The Court agreed, noting that "the basic policy of the statute requires that
we focus on fairness to individuals rather than fairness to classes.
Practices that classify employees in terms of religion, race or sex tend to
preserve traditional assumptions about groups rather than thoughtful
scrutiny of individuals."74
Much has been written about the wisdom, or lack thereof, of Manhart.1
The central oddity of Manhart is the Court's almost nonchalant, yet truly
radical suggestion that insurance practices should involve the "thoughtful
scrutiny of individuals.."76 This statement suggests a complete
abandonment of all risk classifications. Of course, a total inability to
classify risks would not lead to the end of insurance, just a change in
pricing. Without the ability to classify, an insurer could still charge each
individual a price based upon the average expected loss for all insureds.
The addition of a fee to cover expenses and profit would enable the insurer
to continue to provide coverage to everyone at the same price and without
any distinctions. This suggestion is radical in that it sweeps aside, without
consideration, the positive effects of risk classification.
Risk classification has several positive effects on the market for
insurance. First, it creates a competitive insurance market and promotes
efficient pricing practices. Second, and equally important, risk
classification creates loss prevention incentives on the part of insureds.
This can occur in two ways: behavior/care level effects and activity level
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges or
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.
74Manhart, 435 U.S. at 709.
15See, e.g., George J. Benston, -The Economics of Gender Discrimination in Employee
Fringe Benefits: Manhart Revisited, 49 U. CHI. L. REv. 489 (1982); Morton C. Bernstein &
Lois G. Williams, Title VII and the Problem of Sex Classifications in Pension Programs, 74
COLUM. L. REv. 1203 (1974); Lea Brilmayer et al., Sex Discrimination in Employer-Sponsored
Insurance Plans: A Legal and Demographic Analysis, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 505 (1980); David
W. Calton, Note, Sex Discrimination-Pensions-The Court Takes a Stand: Arizona v. Norris,
30 WAYNE L. REv. 1329 (1984); Anne C. Cicero, Strategies for the Elimination of Sex
Discrimination in Private Insurance, 20 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 211 (1985); Spencer L.
Kimball, Reverse ,Sex Discrimination: Manhart, 1979 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 83; George
Rutherglen, Sexual Equality in Fringe-Benefit Plans, 65 VA. L. REv. 199 (1979).
76Manhart, 435 U.S. at 709.
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effects." Behavior/care level effects are manifested when an insured,
recognizing that her premiums will rise in the event of an accident, opts to
drive with greater care. This incentive to prevent losses only exists so
long as insurance premiums are a function of classifications-based
experience rating.
In addition, an insured's activity level may be appropriately affected by
risk classification if, for example, a driver finds she can no longer afford
automobile insurance because her previous risky (expensive) driving has
made insurance unaffordable. The dangerous driver will have to cease
driving altogether or drive without any coverage. This activity level effect
is desirable because those who have been classified as dangerous drivers
based on experience (and other factors) will find it most expensive to
continue.
Although many are offended by sex-based distinctions, and with good
reason," the complete failure to classify means that high cost users have
"For a discussion of care level effects and activity level effects, see Steven Shavell, Strict
Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1980).
"Most gender-based classifications have evolved from a paternalistic desire to protect
women. The early 1970s, however, marked a change in the Supreme Court's attitude towards
gender-based distinctions. This shift in attitude was born from a realization that paternalistic
attitudes did not always protect women but sometimes had quite the opposite effect. Writing
for a plurality in 1973, Justice Brennan said, "Traditionally, such discrimination was
rationalized by an attitude of 'romantic paternalism" which, in practical effect, put women, not
on a pedestal, but in a cage." Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973). For the past
twenty years, the Court has reviewed laws and policies that create sex-based distinctions with
heightened scrutiny. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
Despite the distance the Court has travelled over the past twenty to twenty-five years,
notions of fundamental gender difference remain. When the Court has analyzed the law in
question based solely on equal protection principles-whether two groups are being treated
differently by the law--the Court more often than not strikes the statute down as violative of the
Fourteenth Amendment. See generally Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455 (1981); Caban v.
Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977); Craig v. Boren,
429 U.S. 190 (1976); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420
U.S. 636 (1975); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645
(1972). But see Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496 n.20 (1974) (upholding California's
disability insurance program that excluded pregnancy-related disabilities from coverage) ("The
California insurance program does not exclude anyone from benefit eligibility because of
gender but merely removes one physical condition-pregnancy-from the list of compensable
disabilities."). Whenever the Court has focused its legal analysis on physical or societal
differences between the sexes, however, it historically has upheld laws differentiating on the
basis of gender. See, e.g., Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (upholding Congress'
decision to require men, but not women, to register for the draft); Michael M. v. Sonoma
County Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 469 (1981) (upholding a California statute which made
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absolutely no incentive to modify their behavior and take advantage of a
premium reduction. For example, a heavy smoker who obtains health
insurance under a strict no-classifications regime, has no incentive to
discard this notoriously"M unhealthy habit because she knows that her
men alone criminally liable for statutory rape) ("[Tihis Court has consistently upheld statutes
where the gender classification is not invidious, but rather realistically reflects the fact that the
sexes are not similarly situated in certain circumstances."); Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347
(1979) (upholding a Georgia statute permitting the mother but not the father of an illegitimate
child to sue for the wrongful death of the child); Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977)
(upholding a provision of the Social Security Act that had the effect of granting to retired
female workers higher monthly old-age benefits than those received by similarly situated retired
male workers); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 353 (1974) (upholding a Florida statute
providing a property tax exemption for widows but not widowers). While the Court seems at
first to be helping women via paternalism, upon closer examination the dangerous effects of
these holdings become apparent. For example, in Michael M., in the process of upholding a
statutory rape scheme which applied only to males, the Court failed to consider the different
conceptions of appropriate sexuality applied to young men and to young women, and the way in
which this has stereotyped and constrained women. As Stephanie Wildman has said:
The stereotyping of women into dependent roles, the stereotyping of fathers as
having minimal involvement with their children, the right of women to control their
destiny, the role of pregnant women in the work force, the economic disadvantaging
of women in the work force, and discrimination against women in the military,
present a litany of real grievances about the role assigned to women in this culture.
However, when translated into legal language these claims become a battleground of
due process versus equal protection, strict scrutiny versus reasonable basis,
penumbras of the Bill of Rights, and a questioning of the very existence of sex
discrimination. The abstraction of these very real social problems into this legal
vocabulary has diverted attention from the immediate goal of combating sex
discrimination.
Stephanie M. Wildman, The Legitimation of Sex Discrimination: A Critical Response to
Supreme Court Jurisprudence, 63 OR. L. REv. 265, 286-87 (1984) (footnotes omitted).
9It has been estimated that cigarette smoking accounts for more than $17 billion in medical
care costs annually. Emmet W, Lee & Gilbert E. D'Alonzo, Cigarette Smoking, Nicotine
Addiction, and Its Pharmacologic Treatment, 153 ARCH. INTERN. MED. 34-35 (1993). This is a
conservative figure, however. Other studies have estimated medical care costs alone to be
between $22 and $23 billion annually. Kenneth E. Warner, Health and Economic Implications
of a Tobacco-Free Society, 258 JAMA 2080, 2084 (1987). The economic liability to society
caused by smoking is also measured in terms of "indirect costs of productivity losses associated
with the premature mortality and excess morbidity of smokers." Id. These costs are estimated
at between $30 and $43 billion annually. Id.
The estimated lifetime medical expenses and loss of earnings attributable to a two-
pack-per-day habit for a smoker younger than 50 years exceed $34,000. This cost to
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healthier friends and neighbors will continue to subsidize her premiums
regardless of her behavior.
Consider the arguably more serious case of a no-classification auto
insurance regime. Under such a system, a reckless driver pays the same
premium for auto insurance as a careful, prudent driver. Every time the
reckless driver has an accident, his more careful friends and neighbors
"encourage" his undesirable behavior in the form of premium
supplements. Surely this kind of risk-distributional function is perverse in
that it leads to an increase in undesirable behavior by risk-loving
individuals and financially penalizes those whose behavior is the least
objectionable.
Yet, this is the logic of Manhart. At least for those categories explicit
in Title VII, s0 risk classifications are not permitted, even where the
underlying actuarial assumptions are not at issue. This extreme position
on the undesirability of risk classification might suggest that the Court
sees no value in the efficiency and loss prevention enhancing attributes of
traditional risk management techniques. We know this is not the case.
Risk management practices, as recent ERISA decisions demonstrate," are
not wholly out of favor, and there is no indication that all risk
classifications are forbidden.
The question remains, why forbid classifications based on the
categories specified in Title VII and not all that relate to personal,
immutable characteristics? The logic of Manhart would suggest
outlawing classifications based upon sexual orientation, height and weight,
the individual smoker does not include the cost of the cigarettes and property
damage, e.g., to clothing and due to accidental fires, attributable to smoking.
Lee & D'Alonzo, supra, at 35-36.
s°"[R]ace, color, religion, sex [and] national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1988).
"
1The McGann case itself was obviously decided based on traditional risk management
practices. Justifying his client's position, Mark A. Huvard, a lawyer for H & H Music, said that
"the company had to 'limit its exposure on things that are exotic' or else drop basic health
coverage for several hundred other employees." Milt Freudenheim, Employers Winning Right
to Cut Back Medical Insurance, N.Y. TIMEs, March 29, 1992, at Al, 24. Also, in Owens, after
plaintiff became stricken with AIDS, his employer's insurance provider communicated its
"intent to cancel Storehouse's policy because of the high incidence of AIDS in the retail
industry generally and among Storehouse's plan members in particular." Owens v. Storehouse,
Inc., 984 F.2d 394, 396 (1 lth Cir. 1993). The federal appeals court affirmed the district court's
granting of summary judgement in favor of the defendant ruling that § 510 of ERISA "does not
prohibit an employer from crafting its medical plan to meet economic imperatives. Neither
does it mandate fixed coverage of catastrophic diseases." Id. at 400.
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disability, sight and physical reaction time (major factors in auto claims
cases), and genetic predisposition to catastrophic illness. The
countervailing logic of risk classification would militate in favor of
reversing Manhart and allowing all of these classifications if an insurer
found it economical to develop and use them. For, if the use of sex, race,
and other touchy characteristics were truly discriminatory (i.e., actuarially
unsound as opposed to simply uncomfortable), there would be a huge
profit incentive for a new insurer to enter the market, discard "bigoted"
classification practices and, armed with inoffensive classifications, make
huge sums of money. That this has not happened suggests that
classification practices, even those which draw distinctions that may
generate discomfort, are not mere pretexts for irrational, discriminatory
acts. On the contrary, these practices are nothing more than attempts to
gather and sort information about diverse populations and to insist that
those who are more likely to create losses pay more than those who are
not.
B. Empirical Evidence About Gendered Pension Classifications
Enough time has elapsed since Manhart to have enabled empirical
evaluations of the effects of the no gender classifications rule on both
pension coverage 2 and participation rates. 3 Since Manhart was decided,
several changes have taken place in pension coverage. First, overall labor
force pension coverage declined during the 1980s, especially among
younger male workers." This is, in part, because employment patterns
"
2Pension coverage refers to the number of employees whose employers offer access to a
pension plan, whether defined contribution, defined benefit, 401(k) or 403(b). LANGBEIN &
WOLK, supra note 72, at 24. Section 403(b) plans, also known as tax-sheltered annuities,
often operate as "salary reduction" arrangements, under which the employee and the
employer agree that the employee's salary will be reduced in the future and the
reduction is contributed to the 403(b) plan. These salary reduction arrangements
function much like 401(k) plans, in that the voluntary deferral (within limits similar
to 401(k) plans) is not included in the employee's income.
Id. at 123.
3Pension participation rates refers to the number of employees who chose to participate in
non-mandatory plans. Mandatory plans are those minimum pension programs that must be
offered by employers. Id. at 35.
84Between 1979 and 1988 coverage fell by 14 points among workers aged 25-34;
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shifted toward jobs with lower rates of pension coverage. At the same
time, fewer eligible employees were electing to participate in employer-
sponsored pension plans."
Reductions in pension plan coverage and participation are important
concerns because they affect the likelihood that an individual will reach
retirement with only a public pension6 for support. In addition, pension
among high-school dropouts aged 25-64, it fell by 17 points; and for the intersection
of these groups, men aged 25-34 with less than 12 years of schooling, pension
coverage fell by a stunning 26 percentage points. By contrast, pension coverage
among male college graduates aged 35-64... fell by only 5 percentage points ....
David E. Bloom & Richard B. Freeman, The Fall in Private Pension Coverage in the United
States, AM. ECON. ASS'N PAPERS & PRoc. 539, 540 (1992) (published in 82 AM. ECON. REV.).
The decline in pension coverage during the 1980's has been attributed to two general causes.
The first is structural changes in the labor market. William E. Even & David A. Macpherson,
Why Did Male Pension Coverage Decline in the 1980s?, 47 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 439, 440
(1994) ("[T]he fraction of the work force that was unionized, in manufacturing, and at large
employers declined during the 1980s. Since these job characteristics have been associated with
higher pension coverage, these shifts may account for some of the decline."). Second,
Structural changes in the pension market may also have played a role in the decline in
coverage during the 1980s. For example, the changing regulatory environment
during the 1980s may have caused coverage to decline. Hay-Huggins (1990)
provided evidence that regulatory changes substantially increased both pension start-
up costs and continuing administrative costs associated with pension systems during
the 1980s. These greater costs could lead finns to drop coverage, and may impede
new firms from adopting a plan.
Id. For a thorough discussion of employee demand for pensions, see Alan L. Gustman et al.,
The Role of Pensions in the Labor Market: A Survey of the Literature, 47 INDUS. & LAB. REL.
REV. 417 (1994).
"SAs Even and MacPherson state:
Among the young [aged 21-35], the percentage of workers offered a pension plan fell
by 2.6 [percentage] points [from 1979 to 1988], whereas the percentage that
participated (among those who were offered a plan) fell by 6.9 points. Among the
mature [aged 36-55], the offer rate actually rose 0.8 points, while the participation
rate fell 3.2 points.
Even & Macpherson, supra note 84, at 452.
s61t is not likely that the employee who relies solely on social security to supply retirement
income will be able to maintain preretirement income levels. According to statistics compiled
by Munnell "a worker aged sixty-five earning $13,783 (average wage) in 1981 receive[d] a
benefit in early 1982 equal to 47 percent of preretirement earnings; to maintain his
preretirement standard of living, he would need approximately 68 percent of prior earnings."
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savings are part of the national savings rate, and reductions in the already
low U.S. savings rate could lead to reduced opportunities for growth and
investment.s"
With the importance of pension savings in mind, it is startling to
discover that one effect of Manhart appears to be an increase in
discrimination in pension compensation. A recent study prepared by
researchers at the U.S. Department of Labor8 demonstrates that the unisex
pension policy required by Manhart "transfers wealth among single life
annuitants without reducing discrimination in pension compensation,
[therefore] it is properly evaluated as a transfer program .... The largest
costs are borne by men in plans predominantly comprising women; the
largest gains are received by women in plans predominantly comprising
men.""s
What this means is that while the Court was correct in determining that
ALICIA H. MUNNELL, THE ECONOMICS OF PRIVATE PENSIONS 23 (1982). Although "[r]etirees,
require considerably less than 100 percent of their preretirement income to maintain their
standard of living," id, according to the above figures the 65 year old average wage earner
would have to come up with 21 percent of preretirement earnings through savings of one kind
or another in order to maintain a preretirement standard of living. It is important to note,
however, that the replacement of earnings provided by social security tends to increase as
preretirement wage earnings decrease if the retiree is married. Id. at 26.
"TBeginning in the 1980s, when "the baby boomers were spending heavily at the start of
their careers for such items as housing and furnishings," the savings rate in the United States
took a nose dive. Gene Koretz, A Low Savings Rate Hurts-But So Would A High One, BUS.
WK., Nov. 19, 1990, at 37. "Instead of rising, the personal savings rate, which averaged 8% in
the 1970s, fell like a stone during the expansion-hitting a postwar low of 2.9% of disposable
income in 1987 as households took on a record amount of debt to maintain or improve their
living standards." Id. By 1993 the savings rate in the U.S. rose to a still meager 5%. Louis S.
Richman, How Americans Can Save More, 128 FORTUNE, Nov. 15, 1993, at 97. Meanwhile,
personal savings rates in other industrialized countries make the United States look like "a
grasshopper in a world of ants." Al Sommers, Is the United States A Rotten Saver?, 31 ACROSS
THE BOARD, Apr. 1994, at 15-16. For example, "[tihe Japanese save about 17% of their
income." Nation's Low Savings Rate Causes Concern (Congress Considers Restoring IRA
Deduction Advantages), 110 SAVINGS INSTITUTIONS, Dec. 8, 1989, at 8. The effects of
Americans' inability to save has staggered growth and perpetuated this country's disadvantage
in the world market by pushing "real interest rates to record highs." Id. "This has caused 'U.S.
capital costs to soar above those abroad, which is limiting investment and productivity."' Id.
The bottom line is that unless Americans change their spend and save patterns, this country's
"economic future is far from certain." Economists Bemoan Low Savings Rate (But Aging Baby
Boomers Could Be The Key), SAVINGS INSTITUTIONS, April 1990, at 39.
"
8David D. McCarthy & John A. Turner, Risk Classification and Sex Discrimination in





sex discrimination occurs against high mortality risk women when they
participate in pension plans using sex-based mortality tables, it erred in
concluding that such discrimination "is necessarily sex discrimination in
compensation." A sex-based classification can minimize the kind of
individual discrimination the Court was concerned with in Manhart
because:
[w]hen all types of annuities are considered, it is unclear
that unisex pension policy furthers the goal of reducing
economic disparity [between men and women].... [Mien
received more net gain than women from unisex pensions.
This unexpected result occurred because the benefits of
retired men receiving joint and survivor benefits were
increased since the benefit reduction for providing
survivors' benefits to their wives was lessened. 9
None of this suggests that the value judgment implicit in Manhart-the
avoidance of classifications to protect groups which have suffered
historical discrimination-was wrong. It does, however, raise questions
about the efficacy of prohibiting classifications as a mechanism for
equalizing compensation.
C. Selecting From Among Values Affected By Classification
How then can one choose between the attractions of classification-
efficiency and the creation of loss prevention incentives-and the
sympathetic desire of the Court to avoid practices which further reinforce
patterns of compensation which are a function of discrimination? In work
far afield from this paper, Mari Matsuda argued for approaches which
"give special credence to the perspective of the subordinated" and for a
"first principle of anti-subordination."92 Assuming it is unnecessary to
90Id. at 101.
9 11d.
92Mari J. Matsuda, Pragmatism Modified and the False Consciousness Problem, 63 S. CAL.
L. REv. 1763, 1764 (1990); see also Alex M. Johnson, Jr., The New Voice of Color, 100 YALE
L.J. 2007, 2015-16 (1991) (asserting that scholars of color are able to speak from a unique
perspective unavailable to white scholars). Professor Johnson carefully points out, however,
that the "voice of color" does not always exist whenever a scholar of color speaks. Instead,
"The scholar of color must draw on her experiences and general insight gained as a person of
color before the voice of color is articulated." And see Margaret J. Radin, The Pragmatist and
the Feminist, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1699, 1707 (1990) (arguing that pragmatism and feminism are
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make the case for the pervasive subordination of disabled individuals in
our society, including those with gainful employment like McGann, what
is lost by forbidding insurers from singling out particular catastrophic
conditions? First, and most obvious, is the cost to other members of the
insured group. Is the anti-subordination principle so valuable that it ought
to outweigh all other competing economic concerns? Suppose that
application of the anti-subordination principle results in no insurance
coverage for anyone, or insurance offered at a price which no employee
can afford. It is hard to see how any employee, even one who is disabled,
benefits by this result.
When the Fifth Circuit in McGann suggested that the central issue was
the continued financial integrity of the plan, 93 this was merely another way
of stating that the interests of one individual must give way when they are
so at odds with the.very existence of all the needs of the larger group. (If
group insurance has its own first principle it is probably protection of the
alike in that they "both arrive at an embodied perspectivist view of knowledge"). Radin states
that pragmatism and feminism largely share the commitment to finding knowledge in the
particulars of experience. "It is a commitment against abstract idealism, transcendence,
foundationalism, and atemporal universality; and in favor of immanence, historicity,
concreteness, situatedness, contextuality, embeddedness, narrativity of meaning."); Martha
Minow & Elizabeth V. Spelman, In Context, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1597, 1601 (1990) (explaining
the importance of seeing things in the context in which they are presented). The authors
emphasize "context" in order to expose how apparently neutral and universal rules in
effect burden or exclude anyone who does not share the characteristics of privileged,
white, Christian, able-bodied, heterosexual, adult men for whom those rules were
actually written. It is the particular particularities associated with legacies of power
and oppression [the authors] mean to highlight by the interest in context.
But see Richard Delgado, When a Story Is Just a Story: Does Voice Really Matter?, 76 VA. L.
REv. 95, 99-100 (1990) (arguing that Critical Race Theorists like Professor Matsuda
are urging nothing more unusual than that persons who have grown up in the
minority community may have information not easily accessible to others and a
special stake in disseminating it. Encouraging them to do so seems no stranger than
holding that university professors should determine academic policy or that the
patient in the dentist's chair is the one who knows when it hurts.);
Randall L. Kennedy, Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1745, 1749
(1989) (denying that historically oppressed persons, those of color in particular, speak with any
singular voice and that they have any unusual insights into issues concerning race).
93McGann v. H & H Music Co., 946 F.2d 401,404 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
482 (1992).
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group's continued existence.) Of course, under a universal payer system,
which some advocate,94 McGann's employer would not have been faced
with the difficult decision of passing along enormous premium increases
to employees or dropping coverage altogether in order to pay for
McGann's AIDS treatment. In a real sense though, the price controls such
a system would require would simply spread the cost of McGann's
treatment over the entire tax-paying population.9s At some point, even that
larger group would find its ability to cover itself at a reasonable cost
threatened if it continued to pay for every conceivable condition and
treatment regardless of circumstances.96 Under those conditions, the large
group's instinct for self-preservation would undoubtedly triumph. Just as
the group in McGann did, society would and should opt for some caps and
exclusions.
Possibly the most troubling aspect of McGann, however, is the ex post
nature of the decision to exclude AIDS. It was only after H & H Music
94A bill proposing a universal, single-payer system was sponsored in Congress by
Representative Jim McDermott (D-Wash), H.R. 1200, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994), (H.R. 1200)
and Senator Paul Wellstone (D-Minn.), S. 491 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) (S. 491). See also
Adam Clymer, House Bill Asks 8.4% Payroll Tax For' Canadian-Style Health Plan, N.Y. TIMES,
January 28, 1994, at A19. This approach was "co-sponsored by 92 House Democrats and one
independent." Id.
The single-payer plan appears more efficient:
The single-payer plan would create a universal public system of health insurance
coverage with comprehensive benefits financed by income and payroll taxes instead
of premiums. All Americans would be covered, in much the same way the elderly
are now covered by Medicare. Employer-based coverage, private insurance,
Medicare and Medicaid would be replaced by a single plan. Costs would be
controlled through administrative simplification and by a national budget with
Government-regulated payment rates for doctors and hospitals.
Navigating the Health Swamp: A Primer, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 1994, at 4A, 3.
95For an entertaining discussion of price controls in the context of the current health care
reform proposals, see Simon Rottenberg & David J. Therous, Rationing Health Care: The New
Threat of Price Controls, THE INDEPENDENT INST., 1994 (copy on file at DePaul College of
Law).
961n order to reduce cost burdens under the Canadian system, at least one province, Ontario,
which insures 10 million people or nearly 40% of Canada's population, is ending certain kinds
of health coverage. Clyde Farnsworth, Now Patients Are Paying Amid Canadian Cutbacks;
Spending Outstrips the Government's Resources, N.Y. TIMEs, March 7, 1993, at 1, 18. It has
decided to end "coverage of electrolysis, used for the removal of unwanted hair," and is
"reviewing coverage of 40 other items including psychoanalysis, vasectomies, newborn
circumcision, in vitro fertilization and chiropractic, podiatric and osteopathic services." Id.
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was informed of his condition that they decided to drastically cap
coverage. The central issue in McGann is not the usefulness of risk
classifications, which is beyond doubt, but the timing of the employer's
decision to cap coverage. Permitting H & H Music to cap coverage after
McGann contracted AIDS effectively sanctions a miscalculation on the
employer's part and does so at precisely the point in time when McGann
cannot shop around for an alternative insurance source. 7
For years McGann paid his premiums, under the (mistaken) impression
that the $1 million cap could not and would not be taken away. It is one
thing for an employer to decide, without knowing whether any group
member has a catastrophic condition, to limit coverage. This is always a
9 There is precedent for an ex post withdrawal of benefits, however. In Flemming v.
Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 610 (1960), the Supreme Court concluded that social security benefits
were not "an accrued property right" and could be terminated because the putative recipient was
deported for being a member of the Communist Party. In his dissent, Justice Black argued that
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment was violated by this ex post facto taking. He
noted:
People who pay premiums for insurance usually think they are paying for insurance,
not for "flexibility and boldness." I cannot believe that any private insurance
company in America would be permitted to repudiate its matured contracts with its
policyholders who have regularly paid all their premiums in reliance upon the good
faith of the company .... [Congress] ... could repeal the [Social Security] Act....
This means that it could stop covering new people, and even stop increasing its
obligations to its old contributors. But that is quite different from disappointing the
just expectations of the contributors to the fund which the Government has compelled
them and their employers to pay its Treasury.
Id. at 624-25 (Black, J., dissenting).
Some members of Congress, however, have recently responded to this apparent injustice:
Realizing that ERISA no longer provides protection for employees such as McGann,
on February 8, 1993, Representative William Hughes and fifteen other members of
the House of Representatives introduced a bill designed to "reaffirm the safeguards
the drafters incorporated into ERISA." Under this legislation, called the Group
Health Plan Nondiscrimination Act of 1993, § 510 would be modified so that changes
made to eliminate or reduce benefits while an employee is being treated for a disease
or medical condition previously covered by the plan would establish an employer's
intent of discriminate. This modification effectively prohibits the retroactive
reduction or elimination of benefits related to one or more particular diseases or
medical conditions.
Butler, supra note 3, at 1231.
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legitimate financial exercise. It is another matter entirely to make ex post
actuarial reevaluations.98 The latter always brings with it the possibility of
personal retaliation (which McGann alleged), and smacks of "bait and
switch." 99  The former, when premised upon actuarially sound
98Clearly, banning ex post reevaluations as I suggest here will have the effect of penalizing
employers who, from whatever source, have in their possession information regarding a
particular employee's ill health. This may create a perverse incentive not to learn about (or
acknowledge) the presence of a catastrophic illness in the work place. On the other hand, it
creates a strong incentive for an employee who may wish to avoid McGann's problems to
promptly inform her employer of her condition and thereby protect against subsequent caps or
exclusions.
9"Bait advertising" is defined by the Code of Federal Regulations as "an alluring but
insincere offer to sell a product'or service which the advertiser in truth does not intend or want
to sell." 16 C.F.R. § 238.0 (1994). The "switch after sale" includes, inter alia, "[flailure to
make delivery of the advertised product within a reasonable time or to make a refund." 16
C.F.R. § 238.4 (1994). A number of states have also outlawed "bait and switch" tactics in their
consumer protection laws. For example, in People ex rel. Dunbar v. Gym of Am., Inc., 493
P.2d 660 (Colo. 1972), the Supreme Court of Colorado held that the term "bait and switch" used
in the Colorado Consumer Protection Act was not unconstitutionally vague. The court ruled as
it did for two reasons. First, the statute:
specifically define[d] "bait and switch" advertising as advertising which "consists of
an attractive but insincere offer to sell a product or service which the seller in truth
does not intend or desire to sell." Second, "bait and switch" advertising and selling
techniques have long been recognized in the legal literature and have long been
subject to equitable sanctions.
Id. See also ALA. CODE § 13A-9-43 (1994) which states,
(a) A person commits the crime of bait advertising if in any manner, including
advertising or other means of communication to the public or to a substantial number
of persons, he offers to sell property or services with the intent, plan or purpose not to
sell or provide the advertised property or services:
(1) At the price at which he offered them; or
(2) In a quantity sufficient to meet the reasonably expected public demand, unless
the advertisement discloses a limitation of quantity; or
(3) At all.
and ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-88-107 (Michie Supp. 1993) which defines "deceptive and
unconscionable trade practices" as, inter alia,
(5) The employment of bait-and-switch advertising, consisting of an attractive but
insincere offer to sell a product or service which the seller in truth does not intend or
desire to sell, evidenced by a refusal to show or disparagement of the advertised
product, the requirement of a tie-in sale or other undisclosed conditions precedent to
BAYLOR LAW REVIEW
classifications, is a legitimate, non-personal attempt to control costs in an
effort to protect the continued viability of the insured group.
The spirit of Manhart suggests that the creation of any classification
which relies on categories made up of historically subjugated persons
ought to be unlawful. This may have some superficial appeal, but in the
face of new evidence raising questions about the anti-discriminatory effect
of unisex pension tables, caution is advisable. Risk classification
encourages efficient behavior by persons both inside and outside of any
particular category. It also assigns costs fairly in that those who are high
risk (e.g., smokers, reckless drivers, etc.) pay for their dangerous behavior,
and those who behave "better" (at least from an insurance standpoint) are
rewarded for doing so.
The tendency to encourage loss prevention is lost if risk classification
falls into disfavor. The fundamental unfairness of McGann is mainly a
function of the timing (and therefore the retaliatory nature) of the
employer's decision to cap coverage. Legislation could remedy this result
by limiting employer coverage changes to ex ante situations, cases where
the change is made without knowledge of the particular health needs of
any one group member.
V. CONCLUSION
All employers, and small firms in particular, are under pressure to
control health insurance expenditures as part of their normal efforts to
restrain the growth of total labor costs. Insurance is a typical consumer
good, and as its price rises, demand for it (by employers and covered
group members) diminishes. Recent employer efforts to avoid state
mandates by forming risk-retention pools are consistent with these forces.
Supporters of risk management practices,specifically classification,
reveal preferences for efficiency and loss prevention incentives as the
operative values in the insurance market. These values are not universally
shared and frequently clash with competing concerns about avoiding the
grouping of individuals based on sex, race, etc. In cases such as Manhart,
and more recently McGann and Mason Tenders, this clash is clearly
evident. There is no obvious mechanism to resolve the risk classification /
risk-distributional function debate. Implicit in Manhart is the belief that
efficiency concerns must be subordinated because certain classifications
the purchase, demonstrating a defective product, or other acts demonstrating an intent
not to sell the advertised product or services.
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promote discrimination and deflect attention from the unique qualities of
each individual in the group. This reasoning has always been shaky, but
new empirical evidence which calls into question whether women have
benefited from a unisex pension classification system suggests that
insurance classifications are probably the wrong place to look for culprits
in the war against sex discrimination.
What offends us most about McGann and similar cases is the ex post
nature of the employer's decision to amend the insurance contract.
Permitting employers to cap or eliminate coverages after learning that a
group member needs a specific type of care is both unfair and, especially
in AIDS cases, reeks of personal retaliation and hostility. ERISA should
be amended to permit only ex ante actuarial reevaluations for existing
employees. Such a rule would be consistent with the spirit of both the
ADA and with the anti-discrimination provisions of ERISA.

